"leadership," a concept related to but not identical with our use of management. His units of analysis are agencies (actually, distinct effectiveness evaluations of agencies) rather than programs (or their distinct performance assessments), our focus of analysis (see below). Importantly, nonetheless, Wolf finds that agency leadership matters in explaining effectiveness.
Two aspects of Wolf's suggestive work limit its direct applicability for present purposes and suggest reasons to undertake the modeling effort as we have done. First, his approach, based upon Ordinary Least Squares Maximum Likelihood Estimation, assumes linearity (1993: 169) . Exploration of alternative specifications was beyond Wolf's purview but is at the center of our interest. Second, as he notes, the analysis identifies but does not address issues of endogeneity (p. 176); in particular, we think, management may be in part determined by other elements considered as part of the explanation --such as structure. We argue in this paper that these kinds of interactions, which we treat ultimately as reciprocal, need also to be considered in modeling the impact of public management.
The logic we sketch here, therefore, is designed to move our understanding of public management forward in two ways. First, we treat the need to consider nonlinear relationships seriously, since we believe such specifications are more accurate representations of the ideas and observations of researchers.
Second, we consider the notion that management matters not only in terms of its direct impact on performance --alone and in 2 In an elaboration of the core argument, furthermore (see item 3, below, in Notes on the Extension of the Model), we introduce the point that management may play a role in shaping the institutional context (structure) within which management itself operates. 4 combination with other variables --but also in different ways for different structural contexts. 2 This second step will require us to consider structure as a variable, and we do so via an effort to represent how hierarchies and networks can contribute in affecting performance. For this reason in particular, we model not "agency" performance but program performance.
As documented in considerable detail in the empirical literature on program implementation, many and perhaps an increasing portion of public programs operate through multiorganizational networks of linked agencies and other units (see Provan and Milward 1995; O'Toole 1997; Hall and O'Toole 1999 ; on the intergovernmental aspects, see Agranoff and McGuire 1998) . Reasons are multiple, including: governments' propensity to address "wicked" problems, continuing reliance on crosscutting mandates, popularity of public-private and other forms of partnerships, growing prominence of third-sector agencies as participants in program delivery, political and economic incentives to engage in complex contracting arrangements (Kettl 1993) , as well as political and technical inducements to add participants during implementation to increase service delivery capacity and coopt influential actors into the coalition. Milward, Provan, and Else (1993) depict the results of such trends as a "hollow state" with a core of public management surrounded by an array of cross-institutional, primarily extragovernmental ties. Despite the importance of these developments, however, their manifestations have varied considerably across governments, policy sectors, and programs. Accordingly, considerable variety remains in the institutional settings for public programs. For a number of programs, in fact, single agencies --or "lonely organizations" (Hjern and Porter 1981 ) --remain the relevant contexts (Montjoy and O'Toole 1979; Hall and O'Toole 1999) .
The first-mentioned point, above, can also be explained briefly. Nonlinear functions and interactive relationships involving public management seem implicitly to be at the heart of what many scholars assert or observe in assessing and explaining performance. Indeed, a persuasive literature documents excellence in public management and leadership (see, for instance, Ban 1995; Behn 1991; Cohen and Eimicke 1995; Doig and Hargrove 1987; Hargrove and Glidewell 1990; Holzer and Callahan 1998; Ricucci 1995; and Thompson and Jones 1994) as well as some of the special requisites of quality management of public programs in more complex, networked settings (Gage and Mandell 1990; Klijn 1996; Provan and Milward 1995) .
Much of the logic used in this literature regarding the importance of the management function involves, in effect, claims regarding nonlinear causality and/or interactive influence.
Consider, for instance, the typical observation that skillful public managers find ways to make the most of resources available toward added value in performance. If this claim is to be tested carefully, an appropriate specification would require the use of an interaction term to represent the claim that neither resource levels alone, nor management independently, nor their summed impacts explain what these variables plus their interrelation can explain.
Some Concepts and Initial Assumptions
We begin with three core concepts: hierarchy, network, and management.
Hierarchies and networks are structural notions. A hierarchy is a stable set of relations in which the positions are arrayed in a pattern of formally superior-subordinate authority links. While functioning hierarchies can vary greatly in structure, and while formal structure tells only part of the story, we simplify in the following exposition by treating hierarchy basically as a stabilizing or buffering arrangement.
Hierarchy, that is, provides institutional support for the current bundle of routines, information systems, values, and other key elements influencing production --thus offering a crystallization of stable cooperative effort, the operational status quo. In so doing, formal organization makes it possible to coordinate the efforts of many toward the achievement of common purpose without overwhelming the capacities of individual decision makers (Simon 1976) . Government agencies constitute structures comprised more or less around the hierarchical principle.
By considering hierarchy as a common form, we can focus on an additional structural dimension: the extent to which public programs are located fully within a single (hierarchical) agency or spread across parts of two or more organizations --within a single government, located across governments (such as intergovernmental grant programs), and/or encompassing links between public agencies and businesses or not-for-profit organizations. Such patterns of two or more units, in which not all the major components are encompassed within a single hierarchical array, are designated here as networks. The first example we treat as largely irrelevant for our purposes, inasmuch as it references a kind of policy-making coalition, rather than a network responsible for delivering program performance. The second instance is more significant.
It points to a contingent aspect of the assumption we make about networks and uncertainty. With the limited concertation mechanisms and lack of consensus-building and -enforcing institutions in the US, we expect policy networks in this country to be structurally more open, shifting, and uncertain during implementation than comparable programs in less pluralistic regimes.
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Of course, these interpretations of hierarchy and network are extreme. And so our models actually use a dimension of structural variation: from complete stability (designated hierarchy) to total structural fluidity and consequent uncertainty (network). Actual structural settings range somewhere between these two.
In treating pure hierarchies and networks as poles of a continuum tied to buffering in the interests of stability, we ignore for present purposes "markets" as institutional options.
We do so not because markets cannot be used to implement public policy, but because we are interested in the management function in hierarchies and networks; and pure markets, by definition, are not directly and overtly managed by anybody. Considering the management function in both hierarchies and networks reminds one that the task itself does not presume a particular structural arrangement --that is, hierarchies, and the accompanying formal authority managers possess in such settings. In more networked contexts, those practicing management may need to attempt to concert people and resources toward public purposes, with these elements distributed across agencies, governments, and/or sectors. To some analysts, the very term "management" may seem misleading. A cluster of terms has been introduced with the aim of conveying the more multilateral aspects of this function in interorganizational settings --terms like "fixing," multilateral brokerage, and facilitation (Bardach 1977; Mandell 1984; O'Toole 1983) . In the present analysis, the term management is used to encompass the whole set of tasks related to this function, whether operating in hierarchies or networks. The key difference between management in these two kinds of settings is that in the latter management challenges arise, in addition, from the uncertainties and complexities of the structurally ambiguous setting itself.
One additional point about public management bears mentioning: the function can be shared by actors occupying multiple positions in the institutional setting, not merely from a single locus. In hierarchies, of course, those attempting management are linked via an authority arrangement, and therefore it is possible in principle to align and coordinate the managerial moves from the top. In networks, however, efforts to "manage" the network --including in the interest of different and potentially competing conceptions of purpose --can come from a number of directions or a number of actors, with only limited potential to render these consistent. As one manager tries to shape the setting and its performance along one course of action, others --at other nodes in the system --can be pressing or concerting people and resources in another direction.
In the modeling below, we simplify on this point by treating "management" as an implicitly unitary set of efforts. In other words, we model here an overall network management. We do develop some distinct elements to the managerial function and consider them separately. But the models developed in this way do not address directly the possibility of independent and uncoordinated --even potentially contradictory, or strategically opposed --management efforts. We do not consider explicitly the ways in which this feature of management in networks complicates the management function itself, but we would argue that the point is related to the nature of the games that managers must play.
Other managers in a network can force a given manager to play a given game with a move. In effect, then, "management" as represented in our models can be as a considered as a more simplified vector sum of the full set of management efforts. The moves comprising the vector eventually need to be categorized and analyzed by both direction and heterogeneity (consistency). This complication could be the subject of later modeling efforts.
Building the Model
Our objective in modeling management as it affects both hierarchies and networks is to generate some precise predictions that can be tested empirically if adequate data can be found.
The model strategy that we will use is to start with simple concepts and then gradually add complexity to the model. As suggested earlier, the model should not be considered deductive from a few axioms but rather reflective of both current theory and research on management, networks, and hierarchies.
The Basic System
Organizations, programs, and delivery systems can be 5 We use the term organization or program structure as a general notion, not a synonym for hierarchy. The actual shape of such a structure in a given case is an empirical question. 6 All these issues can be handled through appropriate conceptualization and methods (for a treatment of both equity and excellence criteria in this regard, see Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999a) . 7 By limiting the value of 0 , we are essentially setting up a servomechanism with negative feedback. When The rate of stability (which can be thought of as [1-¦ ] where § is the rate of change) is generally constrained to a value between 0 and 1. As values approach one, the system becomes highly stable; as values approach zero, the system moves quickly toward entropy.
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If values exceed 1.0, the system will 8 When positive feedback exists and program structures "explode" is an interesting question, but one that will not concern us here. Organizations or systems, therefore, can die in two distinctly different ways, with a bang (that is through positive feedback) or with a whimper (running down to entropy). 9 Compliance is, of course, a matter of degree. The Barnard (1938 )-Simon (1976 view of authority is such that compliance can never be assumed. 14 increase without limit, that is, it will explode. 8 Shocks to the system (¨) can come from a variety of forces in the environment. Legislatures or executives can change program priorities, increase or decrease funding or program scope; organizational rivals or coalition members can make decisions that directly or indirectly affect the organization; the economic or social environment can change. In the sections below, we begin to differentiate some of the elements of © and incorporate them into our modeling process.
Networks and Hierarchies
As explained above, networks and hierarchies can be viewed as two poles of a continuum with hierarchies characterized by authority relationships allowing individuals to demand compliance by others. 9 Networks, in contrast, typically lack authoritative links between nodes, and collective action requires negotiation and cooperation. Viewed in this way, a network can be oversimplified and considered as the absence of hierarchy.
Networks and hierarchies generate predictable impacts on the inertial system. If we think for a moment of the ideal typical hierarchy (H) and the ideal typical network (N), then in a hierarchy, the rate of stability approaches 1.0.
10 Strictly speaking, stability can be a product of additional influences beyond either hierarchy or network management. See Section 4, below, under Notes on the Extension of the Model. Once set on a path, they will generally continue along the trajectory with little deviation barring a major shock to the system. Networks in contrast are loosely coupled, indeed they are often characterized by a lack of institutionalization: members (often themselves portions of hierarchical organizations) may be only imperfectly aware of the structure of their own interdependence, links between nodes may be imperfectly formed and in flux, uncertainty is likely to be relatively high, and influences from outside the system are likely to penetrate more readily (on this last point, see below). Networks lose a great deal of energy simply in their day-to-day operation (or alternatively take a great deal of energy investment to maintain). Even without shocks to a network, the network will eventually run down unless additional efforts are made to maintain and revitalize the network. Networks, in short, need management.
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Defining networks and hierarchies as poles of a continuum 11 Our definition of environment is more encompassing than Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (1999: 27-8) . It includes both the environmental forces they note and also the clientele factors. We prefer the term target population rather than clientele but consider target population to be part of the program's environment. 
Shocks and Reaction to Shocks
A major difference between networks and hierarchies is in how they are affected by external shocks from the environment. If the coefficient of stability is only .7, the total impact of X in this case falls all the way to 3.33. Shocks can have a variety of different functional forms and both short and long run impacts; with an adequate data set all these impacts can be estimated.
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The important point in our discussion, however, is that relatively small changes in a system can have major long-run implications simply because the program structures are inertial systems.
Buffering
Organizations establish units or processes to buffer shocks from the environment. In a network the boundary between the structure and its environment blurs. Buffering in networks is 13 Normal not in the sense that this perspective matches the typical observations of scholars and practitioners, but normal signifying the basic approach under the simplest assumption possible: that management is just another input to production. 19 more difficult to accomplish simply because the nature of networks creates additional interdependencies that cannot be isolated from the technical core of the system. We think that the most appropriate way to model the buffering process in a program structure is simply to use the reciprocal of hierarchy as the factor that discounts any environmental shocks:
In this way, an increase in hierarchy acts directly on the exogenous shock to limit its impact on the organization. Any shock that gets through the buffering process of hierarchy, however, can have a substantial long-run impact on the organization. For a network, in contrast, buffering is relatively weak so shocks easily reach the organization; the impact of these shocks, however, is far less --simply because the networks are more loosely coupled.
Management: A Tangent and a Reformulation
What we shall call the normal theory of management 13 is simply that it is one additional factor that affects the performance of a program structure. One crucial task of management is to maintain the structure: to frame the goals, set the incentives, negotiate the contributions from members and from those with whom the system interacts (Barnard 1938; Simon 1976) . The system maintenance aspect of management, we think, can best be modeled as in equation [12] where management (M) supplements hierarchy (H) in the inertial (read structural) portion of the model:
This approach, involving a partitioning of public management into distinct components, may seem reminiscent of Moore's familiar notion of managing upward, downward, and outward (1995) . There are similarities between the two conceptualizations, but the sets of functions/directions are not identical.
17 Buffering is perhaps more common, but there are public and private sector cases where top management seeks to exploit the environment to either influence policy or generate long run support. Selznick's (1949) study of the TVA is one example; another is J. Edgar Hoover's use of publicity and federal focus on specific crimes to enhance the FBI (Poveda 1990 ).
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In this equation, as hierarchy increases, the role of management becomes less necessary since hierarchy by itself generates a relatively stable system. As hierarchy declines, however, this system tends toward entropy unless management increases its impact on maintaining the structure.
Maintenance is only one of the functions of management; 16 let us term this function M 1 . An equally important function of management is guiding how the system interacts with its environment, in modeling terms, how it deals with the shocks to the system. We will designate this second aspect of management as M 2 . We use different subscripts to allow for the possibility that these two functions can vary independently of each other yet still have something in common that we would consider management. Management that seeks to exploit the environment will not try to buffer environmental influences but rather will attempt to magnify some of those influences so that they have a major impact is useful because the ratio of M 3 to M 4 describes how risk 18 An illustration of the use of organizations' preferences for risk in the budgeting process can be found in Krause (1998) . 24 seeking the program system is. As the amount of effort devoted to exploiting the environment increases, this ratio increases.
As the system devotes greater efforts to buffering, the structure becomes more risk averse and the size of this ratio decreases.
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With regard to equation [16] it might also be useful to think of the three forms of management summing up to some constant value. Organizations, thus, must decide how to allocate their managerial resources (M) to three tasks: M 1 or stabilizing the internal operations of the system, M 3 or exploiting shocks in the environment, and M 4 or protecting the organization from environmental shocks. Because hierarchies are more stable and have greater buffering capacities, they can operate with fewer managerial resources than a network and still maintain an equal level of performance. A hierarchy that has a level of managerial resources equal to that available in a network will also be able to devote more of those resources to dealing with the environment than can the network.
Notes on the Extension of the Model
The presentation of different versions of the model in the preceding section constitutes the basic account. Brief mention can also be made, nonetheless, of a set of additional observations and partial arguments that can be useful in the further development of this logic.
A preliminary point can be made in this regard. The overall argument as presented here has emphasized the distinction between hierarchy and network for assessing public management's impact on performance. We have framed the logic in this fashion because we believe the emphasis is apropos, plausible, and salient. At the same time, the crux of the argument should hold more generally beyond the hierarchy-network distinction, since the fundamental issue is not hierarchies and networks per se, but structural stability-instability. With an appropriate measure of stability, therefore, the approach could be applied to programs of all sorts.
Beyond pointing to this implication, we can suggest an additional six routes for further exploration of the model.
Environmental Complexity
The general model (equation [15] ) incorporates the entire environment of the organization through the X-term. This X-term should be thought of as a matrix of influences. Networks and hierarchies clearly differ in the size of the environmental matrices that they have, with the network environment having more elements as shown in [17] where the subscripts designate elements in the environment of (n)etworks and (h)ierarchies.
[17]
This generates a far more complex environment for the network than for the hierarchy.
Hierarchy as a Limit on Relationships
Hierarchy may be viewed as a means of limiting the number of relationships that an organization must incorporate. If there are n equal actors that must each deal with each other in a network, then the total number of relationships is n(n-1). If n actors are placed in a hierarchy with one actor designated as the superior, the total number of relationships is reduced to n-1.
If the n-1 subordinates are divided into two organizational levels, the number of relationships drops to (n-1)/2 for the organization head while remaining at n-1 for the entire organization.
In small groups, the problems of a network versus a hierarchy are less problematic than in a larger group simply because the maximum number of relationships in a network increases as a square of the number of members. In a hierarchy, the number of relationships increases only in proportion to the number of members if no additional levels are created for the organization. With additional levels, the number of relationships for any single individual drops dramatically in comparison to that of an unconstrained network.
The different functional forms for how relationships increase with an increase in actors in hierarchies and networks provides a relationship-based metric, or at least an explanation, for the differential increases in complexity of networks vis-à-vis hierarchies as actors are added to the system. Points 1 and 2 in combination suggest then that networks experience more complex environments and larger networks also can possess much more internal complexity than do hierarchies of similar size.
Still, few networks operate without constraint. That is, many of the possible relationships between members will not come into play because the interdependencies are small or remote.
Program authority can be used to reduce the number of participants or alternatively can vest participation rights in more individuals. Because relationships are often not required, the number might decline simply because some members do not feel the network is salient enough for them to invest much time in developing relationships.
The Relationship Between Hierarchy and Management
At least since Simon's classic formulation (1976) , it has been understood that managers operate within the constraints of structure while also crafting those constraints over the longer haul so as to shape the possibilities for performance in the [18] H t M t H t+1
The interrelationships between management and hierarchy can be empirically separated with a variety of time series techniques such as vector autoregression or an instrumental variables approach within a normal time series model.
Hierarchies, Networks and Variance
Inherent in our discussion of networks is the idea that the results of any process in a network is likely to be subject to much greater variation than it will in a hierarchy. This variance results from several factors. First, the coefficient of stability is higher for hierarchies so activities will occur in a narrower range than they will for networks. Second, networks are more loosely coupled than are hierarchies and thus the ramifications of any shock or any action of another actor is less predictable. Third, the environment of networks is more complex as a characteristic of a parameter estimate or as it changes over time (through techniques used to assess heteroscedasticity).
Trust
Because relationships in a network are without hierarchy but have interdependencies, relationships with other actors can be viewed as a series of games with specific characteristics (O'Toole 1993 (O'Toole , 1996 . Although relationships may or may not be permanent in a network, the games among players tend to be repeat games either over time, across program elements, or across jurisdictions. Repeat games take on some important characteristics, the most prominent of which is that each player builds a set of expectations based on past relationships with a player.
These long-term relationships can build trust among the participants that will generate cooperative behavior. Network relationships, therefore, are likely best modeled in Bayesian terms with each actor having prior probabilities about the actions other actors are likely to take. With each iteration of the game, consistent behavior will decrease the uncertainty of the game (or that portion of uncertainty that is generated by the other actors as opposed to that generated by exogenous factors).
With cooperation (or alternatively by driving out cooperation), the equilibrium is likely to be different from the equilibrium of a similarly structured game that is played only once.
System Stability
Although hierarchies are more stable than networks all other things being equal, factors other than hierarchy can induce stability in a system. In several policy systems in the United
States, stability is generated by shared goals (See Mintzberg 1979 on alternative coordinating methods). In agricultural research or farm credit policy (see Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999b ) the actors of the policy network share a set of longstanding policy goals. The consensus on these goals reduces the need for hierarchical coordination. In agricultural credit, the existence of a clear bottom line for the policy permits agency adjustments to the policy with little guidance from hierarchical superiors (see also Khademian 1995; Kaufman 1960) .
Mutually reinforcing goals can also be used to generate stability in the absence of hierarchy. Policy subsystems in the United States composed of interest groups, bureaus, and relevant
Congressional committees are known to arrive at a set of agreements that allows each actor to achieve its goals by facilitating the goal achievement of the other actors.
System stability can also be achieved by metaprocesses.
Corporatist political systems, referenced earlier, provide an example. They solve political problems by bringing all relevant interests together and forcing them to work out an agreement that is acceptable to all. The credibility that such policies will be implemented prevents strategic behavior and generates an expectation that all parties to the agreement will live by it. Ostrom (1990) has shown, as well, that nonhierarchical selfgoverning systems for managing common-pool resources can be highly stable over long periods once appropriate communitygenerated norms have been created and (meta)processes involving communication, monitoring, and sanctioning are underway.
Implications
Our effort at modeling the management dimension of programs has several implications for the study of public management.
First, we have demonstrated that it is possible to go beyond ambiguous prescriptions and provide precise specifications that are consistent with the observations of public management scholars. The models presented here, however, should be viewed as hypotheses. We could well be wrong, but we care less about being correct in the details than we care about catalyzing work along these lines. Progress can be expected only through precise and ultimately falsifiable predictions about managing public programs. Only then can the interplay of empirical research interact with theory to provide a cumulative body of knowledge.
Management, in our view, is crucial but also contingent. We have emphasized how management is influenced by structure (networks versus hierarchies); future work is likely to specify other contingencies. We also argue that structural contingencies are shaped in part by prior management activities. Management in our models has different functions --buffering, exploiting the environment, maintaining a stable system, establishing structural forms, and so forth. The model is the first step in a more explicit unpacking of the sometimes ephemeral management notion.
The model also offers a concrete rationale for why network settings are less buffered. By presenting management in its structural context in terms of relationships, we introduce a way of understanding why many networks are more complicated environments for performance and for management. The n(n-1) term suggests a geometric, not merely arithmetic, aspect to the impact of size on network complexity. Management, however, is not the whole story in shaping network stabilizations. Shared values, common routines, and standardized learning are other methods of network stabilization. Some of these other methods may be the result of strategic management choice or they may simply evolve from repeated interactions with network participants.
Our analysis sets the environment to the "game-playing" parts of public management. We do not and cannot offer specific predictions about managerial moves/behavior/choices. In fact, the analysis here simplifies on a critical point by assuming that "management" is a function performed via a single actor or
office. Yet there is good reason to question this assumption and note that multiple managers may be working at cross purposes in a network. While these can be conceptualized as a vector sum for purposes of the model, in the abstract sense, the complication creates a possibly-inherent measurement problem. suggests the initiation of a research agenda rather than the sketch of a one-shot research design.
